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Abstract—A new mechanism aimed at misleading a power
system control center about the source of a data attack is
proposed. As a man-in-the-middle state attack, a data framing
attack is proposed to exploit the bad data detection and identi-
fication mechanisms currently in use at most control centers. In
particular, the proposed attack frames meters that are providing
correct data as sources of bad data such that the control center
will remove useful measurements that would otherwise be used
by the state estimator.
The optimal design of a data framing attack is formulated
as a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP). It
is shown that the proposed attack is capable of perturbing the
power system state estimate by an arbitrary degree controlling
only half of a critical set of measurements that are needed to
make a system unobservable. Implications of this attack on power
system operations are discussed, and the attack performance is
evaluated using benchmark systems.
Index Terms—Power system state estimation, bad data test,
data framing attack, cyber security, smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
A feature of any future smart grid is the promise of a data-driven approach to automated monitoring, control, and
decision as opposed to the current simulation-driven methods.
The paradigm shift to a data-driven framework enables a
deeper integration of data collection and sophisticated data
processing into the monitoring and control process. While
extracting actionable information from real-time sensor data
can make a grid more efficient and adaptive to real-time
operating conditions, it exposes the grid to possible cyber
data attacks aimed at disrupting grid operations and potentially
causing blackouts.
In [1], Liu, Ning, and Reiter presented perhaps the first
framework for a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack on the power
system state estimation where an adversary would replace
“normal” sensor data with “malicious data.” It was shown
that, if the adversary could gain control of a sufficient number
of meters, it could perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary
amount without being detected by the bad data detector
employed at the control center. Such undetectable attacks are
referred to as covert data attacks.
The condition under which a covert data attack is possible
was subsequently found in [2] to be equivalent to that of
system unobservability. In particular, a covert attack is pos-
sible if and only if the system becomes unobservable when
the meters under attack are removed. (or equivalently, the
adversary is able to control a critical set of meters.) The
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minimum number of meters that an adversary has to control in
order to launch a covert data attack, referred to as a security
index, is an important measure of security against a data
attack. It represents a fundamental limit on the capability of
an adversary to covertly disrupt the operation of a grid [2],
[3].
In this paper, we show that a significant barrier on the
capability of an adversary to mount an attack of the type
described above can be circumvented by using a different
form of attacks, that is, one that exploits the vulnerabilities
of the existing bad data detection and removal mechanisms.
In particular, we show that the adversary only needs to gain
control of about half of the meters required by the security
index while achieving the same objective of perturbing the
state estimate by an arbitrary amount without being detected.
The attacks considered in this paper are referred to as data
framing attacks, borrowing the notion of framing as that of
providing false evidence to make someone innocent appear to
be guilty of misconduct. In the context of state estimation, a
data framing attack means that an adversary launches a data
attack in such a way that the control center identifies properly
functioning meters as sources of bad data. To this end, the
attacker does not try to cause malicious data to pass the bad
data detection without detection (as a covert attack tries to do).
Instead, it purposely triggers the bad data detection mechanism
and causes erroneous removal of good data. Unknown to
the control center, the remaining data still contain adversary-
injected malicious data, causing errors in the state estimate.
A. Related work
There is an extensive literature on covert data attacks,
following the work of Liu, Ning, and Reiter [1]. While the data
framing attack mechanism proposed here is fundamentally
different, insights gained from existing work are particularly
relevant. Here, we highlight some of these ideas from the
literature.
An explicit link between a covert attack on state estimation
and system observability was made in [4], [5]. Consequently,
classical observability conditions [6]–[8] can be modified for
a covert attack and used to develop meter protection strategies
[2], [5], [9]–[12]. A particularly important concept is the
notion of a critical set of meters [6], [13], [14]. In assessing
the vulnerability of the grid, the minimum number of meters
necessary for a covert attack was suggested as a security
index for the grid in [2], [3]. Subsequently, meter protection
strategies were proposed in [15], [16] to optimize this security
index.
The framing attack strategy considered here relies on bad
data identification and removal techniques that have long been
the subject of study [13], [17]–[20]. See for example [21], [22]
2and the references therein. Typically, the residue vectors in
normalized forms are widely used as statistics for the bad data
test [17]. In particular, Mili et al. [20] proposed a hypothesis
testing method, in which the set of suspect measurements are
determined by the residue analysis in [17]. The use of non-
quadratic cost functions in state estimation was also studied to
enhance bad data identification performance. Especially, the
weighted least absolute value estimation [23]–[26] and the
least median of squares regression [27], [28] were considered
as alternatives with comparably good performance. In this
paper, we take the residue analysis in [17] as a representative
bad data test and analyze the effect of a framing attack.
However, the same analysis is applicable to other bad data
tests.
Detection of data attacks on state estimation, referred to as
state attacks, has been also studied in various frameworks.
Kosut et al. [2] presented a generalized likelihood ratio test
for detection. Morrow et al. [29] proposed the detection
mechanism based on network parameter perturbation which
deliberately modifies the line parameters and probes whether
the measurements respond accordingly to the modification.
Distributed detection and estimation of adversarial perturba-
tion was also studied in [30]. In an effort to minimize the
detection delay, the attack detection was also formulated as a
quickest detection problem, and modified CUSUM algorithms
were proposed in [31]–[33].
B. Summary of results and organization
We propose a data framing attack on power system state
estimation. Specifically, we formulate the design of an optimal
data framing attack as a quadratically constrained quadratic
program (QCQP). Unlike general QCQPs, which are NP-hard,
the proposed QCQP can be solved by finding a maximum
eigenvalue of a matrix. To analyze the efficacy of our data
framing attack, we present a sufficient condition under which
the attack could achieve an arbitrary perturbation of the state
estimate by controlling only half of the critical set of meters.
We demonstrate the concept using both the IEEE 14-bus
network and the IEEE 118-bus network and show that the
sufficient condition holds for the critical sets associated with
cuts.
The optimal design of our framing attack is based on a
linearized system. In practice, a nonlinear state estimator is
often used. We demonstrate that, under the usual nonlinear
measurement model, a framing attack designed based on a lin-
earized system model successfully perturbs the state estimate,
and the attacker is able to control the degree of perturbation
as desired.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces the measurement and adversary models
including preliminaries related to state attacks. Section III
presents the state estimation and bad data processing method-
ology. In Section IV, we present the main idea of the data
framing attack and the QCQP framework for the attack design.
Section V provides a theoretical justification of the efficacy of
the data framing attack. In Section VI, we test the data framing
attack with the IEEE 14-bus network and the IEEE 118-bus
network. Finally, Section VII provides concluding remarks.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
This section introduces the topology and system state of
a power network, the meter measurement model, and the
adversary model. In addition, the covert state attack and its
connection with network observability are explained. Through-
out the paper, boldface lower case letters (e.g.,x) denote
vectors, xi denotes the ith entry of the vector x, boldface
upper case letters (e.g.,H) denote matrices, Hij denotes the
(i, j) entry of H, R(H) denotes the column space of H, N(H)
denotes the null space of H, and script letters (e.g., S,A)
denote sets. The multivariate normal distribution with the mean
µ and the covariance matrix Σ is denoted by N (µ,Σ).
A. Network and measurement models
A power network is a network of buses connected by
transmission lines, and thus the topology of the grid can be
naturally defined as an undirected graph G = (V,E) where V
is the set of buses, and E is the set of lines connecting buses
({i, j} ∈ E if and only if bus i and bus j are connected.) The
system state of a power network is defined as the vector of
bus voltage magnitudes and phase angles, from which all the
other quantities (e.g., power line flows, power injections, line
currents) can be calculated.
In order to compute a real-time estimate of the system state,
a control center collects measurements from line flow and
bus injection meters1 deployed throughout the grid. The meter
measurements are related to the system state x in a nonlinear
fashion, and the relation is described by the AC power flow
model [21]:
z = h(x) + e, (1)
where h(·) is the nonlinear measurement function, and e is
the Gaussian measurement noise with a diagonal covariance
matrix.
If some of the meters malfunction or an adversary injects
malicious data, the control center observes biased measure-
ments,
z¯ = h(x) + e+ a, (2)
where a represents a deterministic bias. In such a case,
the data are said to be bad, and the biased meter entries
are referred to as bad data entries. Note that even when a
meter is protected from adversarial modification, it may still
have a bias due to a physical malfunction or an improper
parameter setting; filtering out the measurements from such
malfunctioning meters was the original objective of the legacy
bad data processing and is still in practice today [17].
Even though the model in (1) is nonlinear, the state estimate
is generally obtained by iterations of weighted linear least
squares estimation with the locally linearized model [21].
Therefore, it is reasonable to analyze the performance of
state estimation using the locally linearized model around the
system operating point. To this end, in analyzing the impact of
an attack on state estimation, we adopt the so-called DC model
[21]. In the DC model, for ease of analysis, the AC model (1)
1Other types of meters can also be considered, but we restrict our attention
to line flow and bus injection meters for simplicity.
3is linearized around the system state where all voltage phasors
are equal to 1∠0, and only the real part of the measurements
are retained:
z = Hx+ e, (3)
where z ∈ Rm is the measurement vector consisting of real
part of line flow and bus injection measurements, the system
state x ∈ Rn is the vector of voltage phase angles at all buses
except the reference bus (x is unknown, but deterministic),
H ∈ Rm×n is the DC measurement matrix that relates the
system state to bus injection and line flow amounts, and e is
the Gaussian measurement noise with a diagonal covariance
matrix Σ. We represent the noise covariance matrix Σ as Σ =
σ2Σ¯, where Σ¯ is a diagonal matrix representing the variation
of noise variances across different meters (∑mi=1 Σ¯ii = 1),
and σ2 is a scaling factor.
Each row of H has a special structure depending on the
type of the meter [21]. For ease of presentation, consider
the noiseless measurement z = Hx. If an entry zk of z is
the measurement of the line flow from bus i to bus j, zk is
Bij(xi − xj) where Bij is the line susceptance and xi is the
voltage phase angle at bus i [21]. If zk is the measurement of
bus injection at i, it is the sum of all the outgoing line flows
from i, and the corresponding row of H is the sum of the row
vectors corresponding to all the outgoing line flows.
Any analysis based on the DC model needs to be verified
using realistic AC model simulations; we demonstrate in
Section VI that the proposed attack strategy is effective using
AC model simulations.
B. An adversary model
We consider a man-in-the-middle attack on power system
state estimation, where, as described in Fig. 1, an adversary is
assumed to be capable of modifying the data from a subset of
analog meters SA. We refer to the meters in SA as adversary
meters.
The control center observes corrupted measurements z¯
instead of the actual measurements z in (1). We assume that
the adversary knows the line parameters (i.e., the measurement
function h and the measurement matrix H.)
The adversarial modification is mathematically modeled as
follows:
z¯ = z+ a, a ∈ A, (4)
where a is an attack vector, and A is the set of feasible attack
vectors defined as
A , {a ∈ Rm : ai = 0, ∀i /∈ SA}. (5)
Note that A fully characterizes the ability of the adversary. In
addition, the adversary is assumed to design a vector a without
observing any entry of z, i.e., the attack does not require any
real-time observation.
C. Network observability and covert state attacks
For state estimation to be feasible, the control center needs
to have enough meter measurements so that the system state
can be uniquely determined. Formally, a power network is
said to be locally observable at a state x0 if the system
state can be uniquely determined from the noiseless meter
measurements h(x) in a neighborhood of x0. This implies
that the Jacobian of h at x0 has full rank. However, due to the
intractability of checking local observability for all feasible
operating points, the DC model (3) is generally adopted for
observability analysis [6]: the network is said to be observable
if the DC measurement matrix H has full rank. In practice,
power networks should be designed to satisfy the observability
requirement. Hence, we assume that the network of interest is
observable (i.e., H has full rank.)
The concept of network observability is closely related to
the feasibility of a covert state attack. In particular, we need
to introduce the concept of a critical set of meters, formally
defined as follows.
Definition 2.1: A subset S0 of meters is said to be a critical
set if removing all meters in S0 from the network makes the
network unobservable whereas removing any strict subset of
S0 does not.
The covert state attack was first proposed in [1] for the DC
model, and it is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.2: Given a measurement vector z = Hx + e,
an attack a is said to be covert if z¯ is equal to Hx¯ + e for
some x¯ 6= x.
Note that if measurements are perturbed by a covert attack,
the corrupt measurements appear to be normal measurements
from the state x¯. From the above definition, an attack a is
covert if and only if a is equal to Hy for some nonzero y ∈
R
n
. In [2], the condition for existence of a covert attack was
characterized as a network unobservability condition, as stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 ([2]): A covert attack exists if and only if re-
moving the adversary meters renders the network unobservable
(or equivalently, the attacker can control at least a critical set
of meters.) In addition, if a is covert, then so is γ · a, and
‖x¯− x‖2 increases to infinity as γ grows.
III. STATE ESTIMATION AND BAD DATA PROCESSING
This section introduces a popular approach to state esti-
mation and bad data processing, which we assume to be
employed by the control center. Once the control center
receives measurements z, it aims to obtain an estimate xˆ of
the system state x. Because bad data entries in z may result
in a bias in the state estimate, the control center employs a
mechanism to filter out possible bad data entries in z.
Fig. 1 illustrates an iterative scheme for obtaining xˆ, which
consists of three functional blocks: state estimation, bad data
detection, and bad data identification [17], [21]. The iteration
begins with the initial measurement vector z(1) , z and the
initial measurement function h(1) , h where the superscript
denotes the index for the current iteration.
A. State estimation and bad data detection
At the kth iteration, the state estimator uses (z(k), h(k))
as an input, and obtains the weighted least squares (WLS)
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Fig. 1. Adversary model with state estimation and bad data test
TABLE I
ITERATIVE STATE ESTIMATION
Iterative-State-Estimation(z, h,Σ)
1: z(1) ← z; h(1) ← h; k ← 1;
2: while (true)
3: (xˆ(k), r(k))← State-Estimation(z(k), h(k));
4: result← Bad-Data-Detection(r(k));
5: if result == good
6: break;
7: else
8: (z(k+1), h(k+1))← Bad-Data-ID(r(k), z(k), h(k));
9: end
10: k ← k + 1;
11: end
12: return xˆ(k);
estimate of the system state:
xˆ(k) , argmin
x
(z(k) − h(k)(x))T (Σ(k))−1(z(k) − h(k)(x)),
(6)
whereΣ(k) is the covariance matrix of the corresponding noise
vector. Based on the state estimate, the residue vector is also
evaluated:
r(k) , z(k) − h(k)(xˆ(k)). (7)
We assume that the J(xˆ)-test [17], [21] is employed for bad
data detection: the bad data detector makes a decision based
on the sum of weighted squared residues:{
bad data if (r(k))T (Σ(k))−1r(k) > τ (k);
good data if (r(k))T (Σ(k))−1r(k) ≤ τ (k). (8)
The J(xˆ)-test is widely used due to its low complexity and
the fact that the test statistic has a χ2 distribution if the data
are good [17]. The latter fact is used to set the threshold τ (k)
for a given false alarm constraint.
B. Iterative bad data identification and removal
If the bad data detector (8) declares that data are good,
the algorithm returns the state estimate xˆ(k) and terminates.
However, if the bad data detector declares that the data are
bad, bad data identification is invoked to identify and remove
one bad data entry from the measurement vector.
A widely used criterion for identifying a bad data entry is
the normalized residue [17], [21], which is considered one
of the most reliable criteria [19]. In the normalized residue
analysis, each r(k)i is divided by its standard deviation under
the good data hypothesis (i.e., the standard deviation of r(k)i
when there exists no bad data entry in z(k).) If there exists no
bad data entry in z(k), and the state estimate xˆ(k) is close to
the actual state x, the distribution of r(k) can be approximated
by N (0,W(k)Σ(k)) where
W(k) , I−H(k)((H(k))T (Σ(k))−1(H(k)))−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1
(9)
with H(k) denoting the Jacobian of h(k) at xˆ(k) and I denoting
the identity matrix with the appropriate size (see Appendix of
[17] for the detail.) Hence, the normalized residue is calculated
as
r˜(k) = Ω(k)r(k), (10)
where Ω(k) is a diagonal matrix with
Ω
(k)
ii =
{
0 if {i} is a critical set2,
1√
(W(k)Σ(k))ii
otherwise. (11)
Once the normalized residue r˜(k) is calculated, the meter
with the largest |r˜(k)i | is identified as a bad meter. The bad
data identification unit removes the row of z(k) and the row of
h(k) that correspond to the bad meter and returns the updated
measurement vector and measurement function for the next
iteration, denoted by z(k+1) and h(k+1).
Table I provides the pseudocode for the overall procedure
of the iterative state estimation and bad data test.
Using the DC model (3), state estimation, bad data detec-
tion, and bad data identification are the same with that in the
AC model, except that the nonlinear measurement function
h(k)(x) is replaced with the linear function H(k)x (so, the
Jacobian is the same everywhere.) Note that the WLS state
estimate (6) is replaced with a simple linear WLS solution:
xˆ(k) = ((H(k))T (Σ(k))−1(H(k)))−1(H(k))
T
(Σ(k))−1z(k),
(12)
and thus
r(k) = z(k) −H(k)xˆ(k) =W(k)z(k). (13)
IV. DATA FRAMING ATTACK
In this section, we present a new attack strategy on state
estimation, referred to as a data framing attack, which exploits
the bad data processing to remove data from some normally
operating meters and make the adversary meters appear to
be trustworthy. We present the main idea and the QCQP
framework for an optimal attack strategy.
We focus our attention on the case where the adversary
cannot control enough meters to launch a covert attack. A
framing attack starts with setting the set of framed meters,
denoted by SF, which it aims to frame as sources of bad data.
The framed meter set SF is chosen such that after the meters
in SF are removed from the network, a covert attack with
2If {i} is a critical set (i.e., removing the meter i makes the grid
unobservable), its residue is always equal to zero [21], and the corresponding
diagonal entry ofW(k)Σ(k) is zero. For such a meter, the normalizing factor
is 0 such that its normalized residue is equal to 0.
5the adversary meters in SA becomes feasible. For instance,
suppose that S is a critical set. The feasibility condition of a
covert attack in Theorem 2.1 implies that if S\SA is removed
from the network, then the adversary with SA can launch
a covert attack; because, further removing all meters in SA
makes the network unobservable. Therefore, a framing attack
can set SF to be S \ SA.
The resulting perturbation of the state estimate by a framing
attack does depend on the choice of SF. Finding an optimal SF
for a given attack objective is certainly an important problem.
However, it is out of scope of this paper. We focus on the
design of the attack vector for a fixed SF.
A. Effect of attack on normalized residues
To analyze how an attack affects the bad data processing,
we analyze, using the DC model (3), the adversarial effect
on the normalized residue vector at the first iteration. In this
subsection, we omit the superscript to simplify notation: all
the quantities we consider are associated with the first iteration
unless otherwise specified.
Suppose that z is a measurement vector without bad data.
The normalized residue in the first iteration is obtained as
r˜ = Ωr = ΩWz, (14)
where Ω = Ω(1) is defined as in (11).
Due to the normalization, each entry r˜i is distributed as
N (0, 1) unless {i} is a critical set [21]; if {i} is a critical set,
r˜i is equal to zero for any z.
If an attack vector a is added, the resulting normalized
residue is
r˜ = ΩW(z + a) = ΩWz+ΩWa. (15)
Thus, if {i} is not a critical set, r˜i is distributed as
N ((ΩWa)i, 1); if {i} is critical, r˜i = (ΩWa)i surely.
Recalling that the absolute normalized residues (i.e., |r˜i|)
are the statistics used for identifying the bad data entries, one
intuitive heuristic to frame the meters in SF as bad is to make
the mean energy of the normalized residues at the framed
meters as large as possible. Making the framed meters have
large normalized residues at the first iteration is of course
not a guarantee that their data will be identified as bad and
removed in the subsequent iterations. Nevertheless, this is a
reasonable heuristic to avoid the difficult task of analyzing the
dynamic adversarial effect in subsequent iterations. Note that
the expected energy of the normalized residues at the framed
meters is
E
[∑
i∈SF
(r˜i)
2
]
=
∑
i∈SF
E[(r˜i)
2] =
∑
i∈SF
(ΩWa)2i + C, (16)
where C is the number of the meters in SF that do not
form a single-element critical set. Therefore, maximizing the
mean energy of the normalized residues at SF is equivalent
to maximizing
∑
i∈SF
(ΩWa)2i = ‖RFΩWa‖22 where RF ∈
R
|SF|×m is the row-selection matrix that retains only the rows
corresponding to the framed meters.
B. Optimal framing attack via QCQP
The ultimate objective of a framing attack is to gain an
ability to perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree. To
this end, a framing attack aims to accomplish two tasks.
The first is to make the bad data processing remove the
framed meters such that a covert attack exists in the network
with the remaining meters. As discussed in Section IV-A,
we attempt to achieve this goal by maximizing the mean
energy of the normalized residues at SF, which is equivalent
to maximizing ‖RFΩWa‖22.
The second task is to ensure that the attack becomes covert
once the framed meters are removed, thereby making the
attack as effective as a covert attack (i.e., enable perturbation
of the state estimate by an arbitrary degree.) Let H0 denote
the m×n measurement matrix obtained from H by replacing
the rows corresponding to the framed meters with zero row
vectors. Then, the attack becomes covert after the framed
meters are removed (i.e., the attack vector lies in the column
space of the remaining measurement matrix,) if and ony if a
is in R(H0). Therefore, we restrict the attack vector a to be
not only in the feasible set A but also in R(H0).
Based on the aforementioned intuition, we solve the fol-
lowing optimization to find the optimal direction to align the
attack vector:
maxa ‖RFΩWa‖22
subj. ‖a‖22 = 1, a ∈ R(H0) ∩A. (17)
The optimization (17) gives the optimal direction a∗ of an at-
tack vector that maximizes the mean energy of the normalized
residues at SF, among the feasible directions that render the
attack covert after the framed meters are removed.
To provide a more intuitive description of the feasible set
of (17), we introduce the (m − |SA| − |SF|) × n matrix H¯
obtained from H by removing the rows corresponding to the
adversary meters and the framed meters. It can be easily seen
that a ∈ R(H0) ∩ A if and only if a = H0x0 for some
x0 ∈ N(H¯). Therefore, the dimension of R(H0)∩A is equal
to the dimension of N(H¯). For instance, if SA∪SF is a critical
set, H¯ has rank n− 1, and its null space has dimension one.
Therefore, in this case, R(H0)∩A is a one-dimensional space,
and there is no need to search for the optimal direction. On the
other hand, if SA∪SF contains more than one critical sets, the
dimension of N(H¯) is greater than one, and the optimization
(17) searches for the optimal direction in the infinite set of
feasible directions.
Finally, we set an attack vector a as η · a∗ where η ∈
R is a parameter that adjusts the direction (i.e., positive or
negative depending on the sign of η) and the magnitude of
the resulting perturbation of the state estimate. The injected
attack vector will cause the bad data detector to invoke the
bad data identification mechanism for several iterations.
It is important to point out that removal of all the framed
meters is not necessary although it does guarantee the suc-
cessful perturbation of the state estimate. Let N denote the
total number of iterations in state estimation. Then, the state
estimate is obtained by finding the linear WLS estimate (12)
to fit z(N) using the columns of H(N). And, as long as
z(N) contains a meter data modified by the attacker, the state
6estimate will be distorted to fit the adversarially modified data.
In some circumstances, an attack vector designed by (17)
might cause removal of only a part of the framed meters and
some of the adversary meters. Nevertheless, such removal may
still be able to make some adversary meter data remain in z(N)
thereby leading to a successful attack.
The optimization (17) can be written as a QCQP:
minq q
TPq
subj. qTQq− 1 = 0, q ∈ Rp, (18)
where
P , −(RFΩWB)T (RFΩWB), Q , BTB, (19)
and B ∈ Rm×p is the basis matrix of the p-dimensional
vector space R(H0)∩A. Note that the dimension p is nonzero
because SF is set such that the feasible set of (17) is nonempty.
In addition, P is negative semidefinite, and Q is positive
definite since B has full column rank. The positive definiteness
of Q implies that a solution exists (i.e., the objective function
is bounded below.)
The KKT conditions for (18) are as follows:
Pq+ λ(Qq) = 0, qTQq− 1 = 0, (20)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the equality constraint.
The optimal solution q∗ of (18) is the one that results in
the minimum objective function value among all (λ,q) pairs
satisfying the KKT conditions (20).
The KKT conditions (20) imply that
Q−1Pq = λq;
qTPq = qT (−λQq) = −λqTQq = −λ. (21)
For any solution (λ,q) of (20), the first equation means that
λ should be an eigenvalue of Q−1P, and q should be in the
corresponding eigenspace. The second equation means that the
objective function value at q is equal to −λ. Therefore, we
can find an optimal solution q∗ of (18) as follows: (i) find the
maximum eigenvalue of Q−1P, and (ii) find an eigenvector q∗
in the corresponding eigenspace that satisfies (q∗)TQq∗−1 =
0. Once q∗ is found, an optimal solution a∗ of the original
problem (17) is obtained as a∗ = Bq∗.
V. FACTOR-OF-TWO RESULT
In this section, we demonstrate that a framing attack enables
the attacker controlling only a half of a critical set of meters to
perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree. Specifically,
given a partition {S1, S2} of a critical set of meters, we present
a sufficient condition under which the attacker can control
one of S1 or S2 to perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary
degree. We provide the numerical evidence based on the IEEE
benchmark networks that for a critical set associated with a
cut, we can find a partition with |S1| ≃ |S2| satisfying the
sufficient condition.
A. Estimation of adversarial state estimate perturbation
The exact analysis of how a framing attack would perturb
the state estimate is a difficult task due to the iterative nature of
state estimation and bad data processing. However, assuming
that meter SNRs are high, we can estimate the effect of
a framing attack as follows. Since SNRs of most practical
meters tend to be higher than 46 dB [34], the high meter SNR
assumption is reasonable.
Suppose that the attacker adds an attack vector a to z, and
the iterative state estimation is executed on z¯. The measure-
ment vector at the kth iteration is
z¯(k) = H(k)x+ a(k) + e(k), (22)
where H(k), a(k), and e(k) are obtained from H, a, and e
by removing the (k − 1) rows corresponding to the meters
identified as bad until the (k−1)st iteration. The state estimate
xˆ(k) at the kth iteration is
[(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1H(k)]−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1z¯(k)
= x+ [(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1H(k)]−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1
·(a(k) + e(k)).
(23)
Hence, the state estimate error at the kth iteration is
xˆ(k) − x = [(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1H(k)]−1(H(k))T (Σ(k))−1
·(a(k) + e(k)).
(24)
In addition, the residue vector is
r(k) =W(k)z¯(k) =W(k)(H(k)x+ a(k) + e(k))
=W(k)(a(k) + e(k)).
(25)
From (24) and (25), we can see that both the state estimate
error and the residue vector do not depend on the actual
state x. Considering that bad data detection and identification
at each iteration exclusively rely on the residue vector, the
observation from (24) and (25) implies that if we aim to
analyze how much the attack would perturb the final state
estimate, i.e., xˆ(N)−x, where N denotes the total number of
iterations, we can simply work with a + e by assuming that
x is equal to 0.
Furthermore, if meter SNRs are significantly large (i.e.,
σ2 ≪ 1), we can estimate the resulting perturbation of the state
estimate by running the noiseless version of the iterative state
estimation on the attack vector a and checking the resulting
xˆ(N). The noiseless version means the algorithm which the
iterative state estimation converges to as σ2 decays to 0.
Specifically, Σ is replaced3 by Σ¯, and at the kth iteration, the
bad data detector declares presence of bad data if and only
if (r(k))T (Σ¯(k))−1r(k) > 0 (i.e., the data are declared to be
good if and only if state estimation results in a zero residue
vector.)
3Note that state estimation and bad data identification are not affected by the
value of σ2. Because, σ2 gets cancelled out in the state estimate expression
(12), and bad data identification relies on the relative order of the normalized
residue magnitudes, which are not affected by the value of σ2. Only bad data
detection is affected by the decaying σ2.
7B. Factor-of-two theorem for critical sets
Suppose that {S1, S2} is a partition of a critical set, and let
H¯ denote the measurement matrix after removing the meters
in S1 ∪ S2 from the network. Since S1 ∪ S2 is a critical set,
H¯ has rank n− 1, and the dimension of its null space is one.
Let ∆x denote a unit basis vector of the null space of H¯.
Recalling the discussion in Section IV-B, if S1 is the set of
adversary meters, and S2 is the set of framed meters, then the
framing attack aligns the attack vector along H1∆x, where
H1 is the m × n matrix obtained from H by replacing the
rows corresponding to the meters in S2 with zero row vectors
(H2 is defined in the same way by replacing the rows of H
corresponding to S1 with zero row vectors.)
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition that
guarantees that a framing attack can use one of S1 and S2 to
perturb the state estimate by an arbitrary degree under the high
SNR setting. The condition is based on the result of executing
the analysis described in Section V-A.
Theorem 5.1: Suppose that if we run the noiseless version
of the iterative state estimation on H1∆x, then there exists a
unique state y ∈ Rn such that the final state estimate is always
equal to y (i.e., xˆ(N) = y) regardless of whatever decisions
are made under tie4 situations in bad data identification. Under
this condition, the following statements hold for any true state
x ∈ Rn:
(1) If a framing attack using S1 and S2 as SA and SF
respectively (i.e., a = η · H1∆x where η ∈ R is a scaling
factor) is launched, then
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)(x + η · y) + e(N)) = 1, (26)
where N is the random variable representing the total number
of iterations in the iterative state estimation.
(2) If a framing attack using S2 and S1 as SA and SF
respectively (i.e., a = η ·H2∆x) is launched,
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)(x+ η · (∆x− y)) + e(N)) = 1. (27)
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark: If no tie occurs in bad data identification, the
condition of Theorem 5.1 is naturally satisfied. Note that a
tie in bad data identification is a rare event, so the condition
is likely to hold for a general partition of a critical set.
The event {z¯(N) = H(N)(x + η · y) + e(N)} in (26)
means that the remaining measurements at the final iteration
of state estimation appear to be normal measurements from
the perturbed state x + η · y. Theorem 5.1 implies that if the
condition is met, then at least one of S1 and S2 can be used as
the set of adversary meters by a framing attack to perturb the
state estimate by an arbitrary degree, because y and ∆x − y
cannot be simultaneously 0. Especially, if the condition holds
for a partition with |S1| = |S2|, then the adversary controlling
only a half of the critical set can perturb the state estimate by
an arbitrary degree.
4It is possible that a tie may occur in bad data identification at some
iteration: i.e., the largest absolute normalized residue is assumed by more
than one meters. In a tie situation, we assume that bad data identification
chooses an arbitrary meter with the largest absolute normalized residue.
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Fig. 2. IEEE 14-bus network: the rectangles on lines and buses represent
line flow meters and bus injection meters respectively. The line meter on the
line {i, j}, that is closer to i, measures the power flow from i to j. The red
dashed line describes a cut, and the circled meters are the meters associated
with the cut.
One important question is whether a partition {S1, S2} with
|S1| ≃ |S2| that satisfies the condition of Theorem 5.1 can
be found in general. To answer this question, we investigated
critical sets associated with cuts5 in the IEEE 14-bus network
and the IEEE 118-bus network, where every bus has an injec-
tion meter and every line has line meters for both directions.
The spanning tree observability criterion in [6] implies that
the set S of the meters associated with a cut (i.e., the set of
all line meters on the cut-set lines and all injection meters at
the endpoints of the cut-set lines) is a critical set if the cut
decomposes the network topology into two connected graphs.
For instance, the cut in Fig. 2 disconnects the bus 3 from the
rest of the network, and {{2, 3}, {3, 4}} is the associated cut-
set. The set of circled red meters is the critical set associated
with the cut.
We executed 20,000 runs of the random contraction algo-
rithm by Karger and Stein [35]—a randomized algorithm for
finding a cut—and found 118 cuts in the 14-bus network
and 290 cuts in the 118-bus network. For each cut, we
found a partition {S1, S2} of the critical set S associated
with the cut such that |S1| ≃ |S|2 : S1 consists of the line
meters (both directions) on a subset of cut-set lines such that∣∣∣|S1| − |S|2 ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, and S2 is set to be S \ S1. In both networks,
for every cut we considered, the partition constructed in the
aforementioned manner satisfied the condition of Theorem 5.1;
this suggests that controlling about a half of a critical set
associated with a cut, a framing attack may perturb the state
estimate by an arbitrary degree6.
5A cut of an undirected graph (V, E) is defined as a partition {V1,V2} of
V consisting of two nonempty subsets, and the associated cut-set is the subset
of lines connecting two vertices in different partitions.
6The average size of the critical sets we considered is 15.7 for the 14-bus
network and 12.7 for the 118-bus network.
8VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We tested the performance of framing attacks with the IEEE
14-bus network and the IEEE 118-bus network using the AC
model and the nonlinear iterative state estimation described
in Section III. The simulation results demonstrate the efficacy
of framing attacks under the real-world power system setting.
Because the ultimate goal of the attack is to perturb the state
estimate, we measure the mean l2-norm of the resulting state
estimate error:
E[‖xˆ− x‖2],
where xˆ is the state estimate, and x is the true state.
A. Simulation setting
For each test network, we chose representative attack sce-
narios (i.e., SA and SF) and tested the performance of framing
attacks. For each case, we ran Monte Carlo simulations to
evaluate the mean state estimate error. In each Monte Carlo
run, the true state x was generated by a multivariate Gaussian
distribution with small variances7. Its mean was set as the
operating state given by the IEEE data [36], which is far
from the nominal state used to obtain the DC model. Based
on the state x, noisy measurements were generated by the
AC model (i.e., h(x) + e). The attack vector was constructed
based on the DC measurement matrix H as described in
Section IV. Once constructed, the attack vector was added to
the noisy measurements, and the iterative state estimation8 was
executed on the corrupted measurements. After the iterative
state estimation finished, we measured ‖xˆ(N) − x‖2.
Note that the design of a framing attack was studied
using the DC model which has only the real part of the
measurements. For the simulations, we designed an attack
vector based on the DC model, and the attack modified only
the corresponding real part of the measurements. Considering
the linear decoupled model (see Chapter 2.7 in [21]), such an
attack is expected to modify primarily the bus voltage phase
angles and have little effect on the bus voltage magnitudes.
Hence, in interpreting the results, we focus on the perturbation
of the phase angle part of the state estimate.
For comparison, we also executed the conservative scheme
in [2], which aims to perturb the state estimate by the
maximum degree while avoiding detection by the bad data
detector. In the conservative scheme, the attack vector was
designed as a solution to
maxa∈A ‖(HTΣ−1H)−1HTΣ−1a‖22
subj. rTΣ−1r ≤ τ, (28)
where the constraint guarantees that the alarm is not raised at
all, and the objective function is the resulting perturbation of
the state estimate due to the attack vector.
7The standard deviation of each phase angle is set to be 1.15 degree. The
standard deviation of each voltage magnitude is set to be 0.01 p.u.
8The false alarm rate of the bad data detector is set to be 0.04 throughout
all the simulations.
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Fig. 3. The 14-bus network: 1,000 Monte Carlo runs. The adversary meters
are (2, 3), (3, 4), and (4, 3), and the framed meters are (2), (3), (4), (3, 2).
B. Simulation results with 14-bus network
We first tested the case where the adversary can control
only a half of a critical set. Specifically, we considered the
adversary who can control (2, 3), (3, 4), and (4, 3): (i, j)
denotes the line meter for the power flow from i to j, and (i)
denotes the injection meter at bus i. The framed meters were
set to be (3, 2), (2), (3), and (4) such that the set of adversary
meters and framed meters is the critical set associated with the
cut in Fig. 2. We tested framing attacks with three different
attack magnitudes: ‖a‖1 is 1%, 2%, or 3% of ‖z‖1.
Fig. 3 shows the resulting state estimate error versus the
meter SNR. The meter SNR ranges from 26 dB to 46 dB
(equivalently, the noise-to-signal amplitude ratio ranges from
5% to 0.5%.) The normal state estimate error and the state
estimate error under the conservative attack are very close, and
both decay to zero as the SNR increases. However, the state
estimate errors in the presence of framing attacks converge
to constants as the SNR increases, and the constants are
proportional to the attack magnitudes especially in the high
SNR region. The result implies that a framing attack can adjust
the state estimate perturbation by choosing a proper attack
magnitude.
Second, we demonstrate that a framing attack may perturb
the state estimate in various directions depending on the choice
of the set of framed meters. We considered the case that
the adversary controls (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (6, 12), (12, 6),
and (12, 13). Note that the adversary still cannot control any
critical set, and thus a covert attack is infeasible. The framing
attack with SF equal to any of the following three sets success-
fully perturbed the state estimate: (i) (2), (3), (4), (3, 2), (6),
(12), (13), and (13, 12); (ii) (2), (3), (4), and (3, 2); (iii) (6),
(12), (13), and (13, 12). For instance, Fig. 4 shows the state
estimate error versus the meter SNR for the first set. While the
three sets all resulted in successful state estimate perturbation,
each resulted in a different direction of perturbation. For
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Fig. 4. The 14-bus network: 1,000 Monte Carlo runs. The adversary meters
are (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (6, 12), (12, 6), and (12, 13), and the framed meters
are (2), (3), (4), (3, 2), (6), (12), (13), and (13, 12).
TABLE II
THE THREE BUSES WHOSE PHASE ANGLES ARE MOST SIGNIFICANTLY
PERTURBED BY EACH ATTACK: 1,000 MONTE CARLO RUNS, SNR = 46DB.
(2), (3), (4), (3, 2),
(6), (12), (13), (13, 12)
(2), (3)
(4), (3, 2)
(6), (12),
(13), (13, 12)
1) bus 12: 2.075◦
2) bus 3: 0.272◦
3) bus 14: −0.180◦
1) bus 3: −2.183◦
2) bus 14: 0.182◦
3) bus 9: 0.168◦
1) bus 12: 2.878◦
2) bus 14: 0.005◦
3) bus 9: 0.004◦
each SF, Table II shows the three buses, whose phase angle
estimates were most significantly perturbed, and the mean
perturbation of their phase angle estimates; positive perturba-
tion means overestimation, and negative perturbation means
underestimation. The table demonstrates that the adversary
controlling a large number of meters may adjust the direction
of perturbation by setting SF properly. Note that the impact of
a framing attack with a specific SF can be estimated based on
the analysis in Section V-A.
C. Simulation results with 118-bus network
Through the simulations with the 118-bus network, we
aim to demonstrate the effect of framing attacks on a larger
network. We considered the scenario where the adversary
controls (20, 21), (21, 20), and (21, 22), and the framed meters
are (20), (21), (22), and (22, 21); i.e., the set of the adversary
meters and the framed meters is the critical set associated with
the cut isolating the bus 21 from the rest of the network. Fig. 5
shows the state estimate errors under the non-attack scenario
and the framing attacks with different attack magnitudes. The
results imply that the framing attacks successfully perturbed
the state estimate in a large network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a data framing attack on power system
state estimation. Controlling only a half of a critical set,
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Fig. 5. The 118-bus network: 250 Monte Carlo runs. The adversary meters
are (20, 21), (21, 20), and (21, 22), and the framed meters are (20), (21),
(22), and (22, 21).
the data framing attack can perturb the state estimate by
an arbitrary degree. A theoretical justification was provided,
and numerical experiments demonstrated the efficacy of the
framing attack.
Our results indicate that most known countermeasures, that
are aimed at merely preventing covert state attacks, are not
sufficient for protection against attacks on state estimation. The
proposed framing attacks can successfully perturb the state
estimate even when those countermeasures are employed. In
designing a countermeasure, the possibility of a framing attack
needs to be taken into account.
An important direction for future work is to design a
mechanism that can nullify the attack impact once the presence
of an attack is detected. In particular, we need a robust
state estimation mechanism that can produce an unbiased
state estimate with reasonable accuracy even when some data
entries are untrustworthy due to the attacker’s modification.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Let S denote the set of sequences of meter removals
that can possibly happen when the noiseless version of the
iterative state estimation is executed on H1∆x. In other
words, (a1, . . . , aM ) ∈ S if and only if some decisions
under tie situations may result in the removal of the meters
{a1, . . . , aM} in the order of a1, . . . , aM . The cardinality of
S can be greater than 1 since different decisions under tie
situations may result in different sequences of meter removals.
For any sequence (a1, . . . , aM ) ∈ S, the existence of such
y—as described in the condition—implies that if all the meters
in the sequence are removed, the remaining part of H1∆x,
denoted by H(M)1 ∆x, is equal to H(M)y, where H
(M)
1 and
H(M) are obtained from H1 and H respectively, by removing
the rows corresponding to all meters in the sequence.
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Now, consider running the iterative state estimation on
Hx+H1∆x+ e, which is the resulting measurement vector
when the framing attack is launched with SA and SF equal
to S1 and S2 respectively. The equation (25) implies that the
residue vector in each iteration only depends on H1∆x + e.
In addition, as σ2 decreases to zero, the results of bad data
detection and identification heavily depend onH1∆x, and thus
the sequence of meter removals becomes highly likely to be
in S. Formally,
lim
σ2→0
Pr((a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ S) = 1, (29)
where (a1, . . . , aN ) is a sequence of meters removed by the
bad data identification rule. Let H(N) and e(N) denote the
matrix and vector obtained from H and e respectively by
removing the rows corresponding to {a1, . . . , aN}. Note that
N , (a1, . . . , aN), H
(N)
, and e(N) are all random.
The event {(a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ S} implies that H(N)1 ∆x =
H(N)y, and thus
z¯(N) = (H(N)x+e(N))+H
(N)
1 ∆x = (H
(N)x+e(N))+H(N)y.
(30)
Therefore,
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = (H(N)x+ e(N)) +H(N)y) = 1. (31)
When the attack vector H1∆x is replaced with η ·H1∆x, we
can use the exactly same logic to derive the following.
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = (H(N)x+ e(N)) + η ·H(N)y) = 1. (32)
Now, consider running the iterative state estimation over
Hx + H2∆x + e; this is the case when the framing attack
is launched with SA and SF equal to S2 and S1 respectively.
First, note that
H∆x = H1∆x+H2∆x. (33)
Therefore, Hx +H2∆x + e is equivalent to H(x + ∆x) −
H1∆x+ e.
Suppose we run the noiseless version of the iterative state
estimation on −H1∆x. The set of sequences of meter re-
movals that can possibly happen is equivalent to S, because
the sign change only flips the signs of residue entries; it does
not affect their absolute values, which are the statistics used for
detection and identification of bad data entries. Furthermore, it
can be easily seen that the final state estimate is always equal
to −y regardless of whatever decisions are made under the tie
situations.
The above paragraph implies that we can analyze the result
of running the iterative state estimation on H(x + ∆x) −
H1∆x+ e by following the same procedure of deriving (31).
In particular, one can easily derive the following:
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)(x+∆x) + e(N) +H(N)(−y)) = 1,
(34)
or equivalently,
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)x+e(N)+H(N)(∆x−y)) = 1. (35)
When the attack vector H2∆x is scaled by η (i.e., a = η ·
H2∆x,) we can derive the following in a similar manner:
lim
σ2→0
Pr(z¯(N) = H(N)x+e(N)+η·H(N)(∆x−y)) = 1. (36)
Therefore, the proof is complete.
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